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Alexander Thurston (2017), Boko Haram: The History of an African 
Jihadist Movement, Princeton: Princeton University Press, ISBN 978 
0691172248, 333 pp. 
 
Alexander Thurston’s Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement 
supersedes everything that has been written so far on the development of 
this enigmatic jihadist movement in northeastern Nigeria. Based on years 
of research in Northern Nigeria as well as his knowledge of a vast number 
of primary sources in both Arabic and Hausa, Thurston is able to present a 
highly convincing account of the historical development of this jihadist 
movement. Organised in five chapters (“The Lifeworld of Muhammad 
Yusuf,” “Preaching Exclusivism, Playing Politics,” “Chaos Is Worse Than 
Killing,” “Total War in Northeastern Nigeria,” and “Same War, New 
Actors”), the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the dynamics that 
led to the emergence, rise, and fall of Boko Haram as an increasingly rad-
ical and militant religious movement in Northern Nigeria – or, more spe-
cifically, northeastern Nigeria – since the 1980s. 
Religious and political violence has been an important and ever-
present feature of everyday life in Northern Nigeria since the late 1970s 
– consider, for instance, the conflict between Northern Nigeria’s Sufi 
movements and their opponents, the Yan Izala movement of reform, a 
series of violent clashes between ethnic groups in the North, the ongoing 
conflicts between Muslims and Christians, and, last but not least, the 
repeated rebellions of Muslim millenarian movements such as Maitatsine. 
Boko Haram has consequently been regarded by outside observers as a 
manifestation of a particularly savage version of Northern Nigerian pro-
test, especially after both Nigerian and Western media started to portray 
Boko Haram as a Nigerian version of the Afghan “Taliban” in the early 
2000s. Yet, such alarmist perspectives on Boko Haram completely missed 
the underlying emic dynamics that drove the development of Boko Haram 
as a distinct movement of protest, not only against Nigeria’s existing pol-
itical and economic set-up and its legacy of corruption and mismanage-
ment, but also against Northern Nigeria’s religious elites. 
By the early 2000s, however, Northern Nigeria’s religious elites were 
represented not only by the well-established Sufi orders but also by North-
ern Nigeria’s Muslim reform movement, the Yan Izala and its “Salafi”-
oriented offspring, the “Ahl al-Sunna” movement. Boko Haram’s uncom-
promising stance against any kind of cooperation between Muslims and 
institutions that were identified as being inherently Western or corrupted 
by “the West” thus eventually even led to a break with Boko Haram’s 
“spiritual fathers” in the Salafi movement, who advocated modern (Is-
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lamic) education and who were willing to collaborate with Nigeria’s insti-
tutions with respect to, for instance, the implementation of shariatic laws. 
In the early 2000s, Boko Haram thus emerged not only as the most radical 
Muslim movement of protest against the political and religious establish-
ment, but also as the most principled movement of opposition against all 
forms of “boko,” “Western culture” (including Western education and 
modern “Islamic” education), and even shariatic laws as applied by the 
“corrupt” political elites of the North. 
Despite some efforts of local politicians in Maiduguri to “domesti-
cate” Muhammad Yusuf, Boko Haram’s leader, by accepting some of the 
political demands of the movement, in particular with respect to the 
“proper” implementation of shariatic laws and regulations, the move-
ment was not willing to become yet another radical movement of op-
position “bought” by the “system.” When Muhammad Yusuf was even-
tually killed in a major riot in Borno State in 2009, the movement, under 
the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau, pursued its course of radical 
opposition with even greater ruthlessness. These dynamics of escalation 
led to a regional war in northeastern Nigeria (in the context of which 
Boko Haram has been able to gain territorial control over major parts of 
the northeast since 2011), a conflict that also spilled over into neigh-
bouring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Only in 2016 was the Nigerian 
government, now under President Muhammad Buhari, in coalition with 
governments in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon and backed by military 
support from the United States, France, and Britain, able to defeat Boko 
Haram militarily. Despite this military success against Boko Haram (and 
its splinter groups), Nigeria has not managed to terminate the movement 
completely: some Boko Haram cells are still carrying out suicide attacks 
in northern Nigeria and in the Lake Chad region. Displaced populations, 
comprising more than two million people at the moment, have also not 
yet been able to return to their homes. 
Although Thurston’s account of these events turns a bit speculative 
in some minor instances – in particular, when the author discusses Boko 
Haram’s activities in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon – his analysis is char-
acterised in general by an extremely well-informed and lucid interpreta-
tion of the course of events and will thus remain, for quite some time, the 
most reliable (and readable) text on the development of the Boko Haram 
movement. A major advantage of Thurston’s text is not only his con-
vincing analysis of political developments, but also an excellent analysis 
of the “theological” debates around and within Boko Haram that have 
been mostly neglected in the past. The book ends with a number of 
recommendations by the author as to how the legacy of the Boko Haram 
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rebellion can be overcome – for instance, in terms of proper regional 
development (infrastructure, education, agriculture) in order to prevent 
the development of militant movements of the Boko Haram type in the 
future. Due to the fact that northeastern Nigeria has always been the most 
marginal (and neglected) region of the country, and as fundamental and 
structural changes in that respect are not within sight, the author’s out-
look is understandably bleak, in particular when we consider that the 
Nigerian government seems to be unable at the moment to retake proper 
administrative control over the devastated rural areas in the northeast. As 
such, Thurston’s text is highly recommended as reading matter not only 
for political scientists and historians, but also for “orientalists.” In sum, 
this text is a must for anybody interested in Nigeria’s recent past as well 
as the dynamics of political and religious development in the larger West 
African region.  
 Roman Loimeier 
